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THE NEW YORK LLC ACT AT TWENTY: IS PIERCING 
STILL “ENVELOPED IN THE MIDST OF METAPHOR”? 
Miriam R. Albert* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One hallmark feature of the corporate form of business organ-
ization is limited liability for shareholders, generally restricting 
shareholder liability for the corporation’s contract or tort obligations 
to the amount of that shareholder’s capital contribution.1  A mythical 
“corporate veil” protects shareholders’ personal assets from the reach 
of corporate creditors.2  A judge can order this veil to be disregarded 
or pierced, when a shareholder engages in certain prohibited conduct 
that typically reflects upon the shareholder’s lack of respect for the 
corporate structure.3  Corporate creditors will not be required to hon-
or the separateness of the corporation from its owners if the owners 
themselves fail to honor that separateness.4  Offering corporate credi-
 
* Professor of Skills, Hofstra University School of Law.  B.A. Tufts University; J.D./M.B.A. 
Emory University; L.L.M. New York University School of Law.  E-mail: miriam.r.albert@ 
hofstra.edu. 
1 Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1036, 1039 (1991) (“A fundamental principle of corporate law is that shareholders in a 
corporation are not liable for the obligations of the enterprise beyond the capital that they 
contribute in exchange for their shares.”). 
2 According to the court in Morris v. New York State Department of Taxation & Finance, 
a leading New York Court of Appeals case on piercing: 
The concept of piercing the corporate veil is a limitation on the accepted 
principles that a corporation exists independently of its owners, as a sep-
arate legal entity, that the owners are normally not liable for the debts of 
the corporation, and that it is perfectly legal to incorporate for the ex-
press purpose of limiting the liability of the corporate owners. 
623 N.E.2d 1157, 1161 (N.Y. 1993). 
3 See id. at 1161 (“The party seeking to pierce the corporate veil must establish that the 
owners, through their domination, abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate 
form to perpetrate a wrong or injustice against the party such that a court in equity will inter-
vene.”). 
4 The Second Circuit offered this commentary on challenges inherent in piercing: “The 
1
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tors access to owners’ assets is an enticing option in the context of a 
limited liability vehicle like a corporation.5  Consequently, piercing 
the corporate veil is a frequently litigated area of corporate law.6 
The tax consequences of the corporate structure, with a tax 
payable at the entity level and at the shareholder level, however, can 
make the corporate structure less appealing.7  A number of alternative 
forms of business have evolved over time to avoid the double taxa-
tion consequence of incorporation while maintaining limited liability 
for owners, including S Corporation elections for corporations,8 lim-
 
jury must decide whether—considering the totality of the evidence—the policy behind the 
presumption of corporate independence and limited shareholder liability—encouragement of 
business development—is outweighed by the policy justifying disregarding the corporate 
form—the need to protect those who deal with the corporation.”  Wm. Passalacqua Builders, 
Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal citations omit-
ted). 
5 However, the doctrine is unavailable as an independent cause of action against the cor-
poration.  See Morris, 623 N.E.2d at 1160.  “However in this context, ‘independent’ does not 
mean ‘separate’; rather, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the cause of action is not in-
dependent because it ‘assumes that the corporation itself is liable for the obligation sought to 
be imposed.’ ”  Sensitive Touch v. Halaas Med. Servs., PLLC, No. 600553/2009, 2009 WL 
4756393, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Dec. 11, 2009). 
6 See Thompson, supra note 1, at 1036 (“Piercing the corporate veil is the most litigated 
issue in corporate law and yet it remains among the least understood.”). 
7 The corporation earnings are taxed at the corporate level, and at the shareholder level if 
the earnings are distributed to the shareholders.  26 U.S.C.A. § 11 (West 2014). 
8 See generally 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1361-1379 (West 2014).  S corporations were the first 
form of business that sought to capture the benefits of the limited liability for owners with 
pass-through tax treatment.  To elect S corporation status, an entity must relinquish a large 
degree of flexibility, and cannot: 
(A) have more than 100 shareholders, 
(B) have as a shareholder a person (other than an estate, a trust described 
in subsection (c)(2), or an organization described in subsection (c)(6)) 
who is not an individual, 
(C) have a nonresident alien as a shareholder, and 
(D) have more than 1 class of stock. 
26 U.S.C.A. § 1361.  New York permits S corporation treatment to corporations which are 
federal S corporations, with some differences: 
At the corporate level, New York S corporation treatment means a re-
duction in the corporate tax rate to the differential rate, with a fixed dol-
lar minimum tax which is not less than $100 for Article 9-A taxpayers 
and $250 for Article 32 taxpayers.  The differential rate is the difference 
between the corporate rate under Article 9-A or Article 32 and the Arti-
cle 22 (personal income tax) equivalent rate.  There is not the complete 
exemption from regular corporate tax that applies at the federal level. 
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN., NEW YORK TAX TREATMENT OF S CORPORATIONS 
AND THEIR SHAREHOLDERS 5 (2000), available at http://www.nytaxexperts.com/pdf/new-
york-publications/New-York-Tax-Treatment-of-S-Corporation-and-their-sharholders.pdf.  
2
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ited liability companies, limited liability partnerships and limited lia-
bility limited partnerships.  Of these, the limited liability company 
(“LLC”) continues to gain ground in New York as a popular way to 
achieve the limited liability for owners, without the burden of double 
taxation.9 
In 1977, Wyoming became the first state to enact an LLC 
statute.10  In 1988, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) confirmed 
the pass-through nature of LLC taxations, so LLCs pay no entity-
level tax and income; and gains, losses, and deductions flow through 
to the owners.11  This was followed by the IRS’s “check the box” 
regulations,12 which allowed unincorporated associations, including 
LLCs, to elect to be taxed like partnerships, and has likely contribut-
ed to the increasing popularity of LLCs.13  The number of filings to 
create LLCs is undoubtedly significant in all states, and can equal or 
exceed filings to create new corporations in some states.14 In New 
York, 21,182 new domestic LLCs were created in 2000 and 75,992 
new domestic corporations were created.15  In 2013, the number of 
new domestic LLCs had risen to 70,238, while the number of new 
domestic corporations had fallen to 69,665.16
 
The LLC is a hybrid form of business, combining features of 
both corporations and partnerships; that said, other than the corpo-
rate-like limited liability highlighted by its very name, the LLC more 
closely resembles a partnership.17  The LLC’s component forms of 
 
Further, New York City does not recognize federal or New York state S elections.  Id. at 7. 
9 According to the New York Department of State, the number of new domestic LPs has 
dropped from 824 in 2000 to 324 in 2013; the number of new domestic LLPs has dropped 
from 485 in 2000 to 204 in 2013.  During that period, the number of new domestic LLCs has 
risen from 21,182 to 70,238.  Angela Persaud, NYS-Dep’t of State, Div. of Corps., State 
Records & UCC (on file with author). 
10 See WYO. STAT. ANN § 17-15-103 (1977) (repealed by laws 2010, Ch. 94, 3).  Florida 
was next, in 1982.  See FLA. STAT. § 608.401 (West 2002).  No other state enacted LLC leg-
islation until 1990, arguably due to the uncertainty surrounding the tax consequences of this 
new form of business. 
11 See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. 
12 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (2006). 
13 See David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: 
How Should Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Re-
sponsibility and Securities Regulation for the Limited Liability Company?, 51 OKLA L. REV. 
427, 448-49 (1998); see also supra note 9. 
14 See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT (2006) (prefatory note) [hereinafter REV. UNIF. 
LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT]. 
15 See supra note 9. 
16 See id. 
17 Daniel J. Morrissey, Piercing All the Veils: Applying an Established Doctrine to a New 
3
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business have structural differences, including owner liability and tax 
treatment.18  Accordingly, the LLC does not fit easily and compre-
hensively into the entirety of existing doctrine from either the corpo-
rate or partnership form.19  For example, some LLCs fall within the 
definition of “security” for purposes of the federal securities laws, 
and some do not.20  Likewise, concluding whether and to what extent 
to hold LLC members liable for entity debts is far from clear.  Is an 
LLC more like a corporation, with limited shareholder liability, or 
more like a partnership, with unlimited personal liability for all entity 
debts? 
Every state now has LLC legislation, although there is dis-
parity in the scope and content of these statutes.  As a result, similarly 
situated litigants who participate in or transact business with LLCs 
may have different outcomes from state to state, and perhaps more 
troubling, even within a given state.21 
 
Business Order, 32 J. CORP. L. 529, 552 (2007). 
18 Steven C. Bahls, Application of Corporate Common Law Doctrine to Limited Liability 
Companies, 55 MONT. L. REV. 43, 62 (1994) (“The problem with applying the corporate test 
for piercing the corporate veil to limited liability companies is that corporate governance 
statutes, unlike limited liability company statutes, provide for centralized management by 
mandating management by a board of directors instead of management by owners.”). 
19 According to Professor Bahls: 
Determination of whether corporate doctrines apply, or whether corre-
sponding (but different) doctrines in partnership law apply, is difficult 
because limited liability companies share some attributes of corporations 
and some attributes of partnerships.  The problem is compounded be-
cause most states have neither codified nor, by statute, rejected these 
common law doctrines for limited liability companies.  
Id. at 45. 
20 The threshold issue triggering the application of the federal securities laws is whether 
the instrument in question satisfies the statutory definition of “security.”  See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 
77b(a)(1), 78c(10) (West 2012).  The term “security” is defined broadly in both the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 
U.S.C.A. § 78c(10).  Neither definition explicitly includes LLCs, but each includes the term 
“investment contract.”  Under SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., any interest that “involves an invest-
ment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of oth-
ers” is an investment contract, thereby included within the definition of “security” and sub-
ject to the rules and regulations of the federal securities laws.  328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946); see 
Miriam R. Albert, The Howey Test Turns 64: Are the Courts Grading This Test on a Curve?, 
2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 19 (2011).  If an LLC is member-managed, each member 
will participate in the management of the enterprise, and thus the profits will not come solely 
or even predominantly from the efforts of others.  However, in a manager-managed LLC, the 
non-manager members are passive investors, and their interests could well be considered 
securities. 
21 See Why States Should Adopt RULLCA, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws. 
org/Narrative.aspx?title=Why%20States%20Should%20Adopt%20RULLCA (last visited 
4
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Piercing the corporate veil continues to be a popular topic for 
commentators,22 and as Justice Cardozo noted, is “still enveloped in 
the mists of metaphor.”23  Early scholarship on LLCs focused on the 
wisdom of importing entire corporate law concepts, like piercing the 
corporate veil, and applying them to this new hybrid entity, without 
questioning whether the concepts were a good fit.24  The application 
of corporate law veil piercing to LLCs has some vocal critics.  Com-
mentators argue that the piercing cases are not consistent, and that 
courts apply “nominal” tests that are “singularly unhelpful” and that 
the “arbitrariness of these nominal tests casts further doubt on the 
utility of the doctrine.”25  Professor Stephen Bainbridge is a particu-
 
Mar. 7, 2015) (“The existing state LLC statutes, however, are far from uniform and many 
have been amended on a patchwork basis and have not kept up with the LLC cases and other 
legal developments.”). 
 According to Professor Thompson, “[w]hen piercing does occur, the courts’ reasoning 
varies with the context, and decisions reflect the differing impact of various statutory poli-
cies affecting limited liability.” Thompson, supra note 1, at 1039.  See also Bainbridge, infra 
note 24, at 91.  But see Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Preserving LLC Veil Piercing: A Re-
sponse to Bainbridge, 31 J. CORP. L. 1063, 1070 (2006). 
22 In 1998, one commentator evaluating LLC piercing under Delaware law stated, “the 
Delaware courts will soon feel great pressure to find a way to pierce the veils of LLCs.  This 
is true even if the courts have to invent a common law of LLC piercing or apply contractual 
doctrines.”  Cohen, supra note 13, at 429.  See infra Part III, for a discussion of the ap-
proaches New York courts take to piercing the LLC veil. 
23 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.), reh’g denied, 
155 N.E. 914 (N.Y. 1927). 
24 According to Professor Bahls: 
One unanswered question is whether common law doctrines applicable 
to corporations are applicable to limited liability companies. . . .  Deter-
mination of whether corporate doctrines apply, or whether corresponding 
(but different) doctrines of partnership law apply, is difficult because 
limited liability companies share some attributes of corporations and 
some of partnerships.  The problem is compounded because most states 
have neither codified nor, by statute, rejected these common law doc-
trines for limited liability companies. 
Bahls, supra note 18, at 45. 
 According to Professor Bainbridge: 
On the one hand, corporate veil piercing cases are highly fact-specific.  
On the other hand, the facts often tell us little about the likely outcome.  
Successful corporate veil piercing claims seem to differ only in degree, 
but not in kind, from unsuccessful claims.  Unfortunately, there is no ev-
idence to date that matters will improve as the vague corporate law 
standards are exported to the LLC setting. 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 91-92 
(2005). 
25 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 109 (1985). 
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larly vocal critic, arguing the doctrine is vague and arbitrarily ap-
plied.26 
Twenty years ago, the New York Limited Liability Company 
Law was enacted, including § 609(a), which explicitly disclaims lia-
bility of members, managers, and agents for the debts and obligations 
of the LLC.27  However, New York courts have held that this limita-
tion on liability is not absolute, and certain conduct on the part of the 
owners can erode the liability shield.28  The statute provides that the 
members will not have personal liability for LLC debts solely be-
cause of their role as owners in the LLC.29  The statute does not say 
that members will never have liability, just that any liability will not 
be as a result of their owner status, leaving open the question of when 
members will be liable for debts of the LLC.30 
Neither the language of § 609(a) itself or its legislative history 
offers any guidance on what factors a court should use to determine 
whether to pierce an LLC.  Since LLCs are a blend of partnerships 
and corporations, the relevant inquiry is to determine whether, for 
purposes of owner liability, an LLC is more like a corporation, with 
its default rule of limited liability, or more like a partnership, where 
partners have unlimited personal liability for all partnership debts.31  
Unlike the Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”), and the 
states that have adopted it, New York’s Business Corporation Law 
(“BCL”) has no statutory limitation on liability equivalent to § 609.32  
However, New York has a well-established body of case law permit-
ting courts to disregard shareholder limited liability based on share-
holder conduct.
  
New York courts, like others across the country, be-
 
26 Bainbridge, supra note 24, at 77; but see Rapp, supra note 21, at 1070. 
27 N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 609(a) (McKinney 2007) [hereinafter LTD. LIAB]. 
28 See infra, Part III.B. 
29 LTD. LIAB. § 609(a) (emphasis added). 
30 Id. § 609(b). 
31 See N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 26 (McKinney 2014).  “It would be unfair to allow LLCs to 
possess the positive aspects of limited liability in a corporate setting without also carrying 
the negative possibility of piercing.”  Karin Schwindt, Limited Liability Companies: Issues 
in Member Liability, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1541, 1552 (1997). 
32 See State Corporation Laws, USLEGAL, http://corporations.uslegal.com/basics-of-
corporations/state-corporation-laws/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2015).  MCBA § 6.22 is the corpo-
rate equivalent of both § 609(a) and § 3.04(b) of the RULLCA, on which § 609 is based.  
Compare REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 304(b), with MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22 
(2006).  MBCA § 6.22(b) provides limited liability for shareholders for corporate debts, a 
provision that according to the MBCA Official Comments “underlies modern corporate 
law.”  The last clause of MBCA §6.22(b) specifically recognizes that shareholder liability is 
possible by the conduct of the shareholder.  BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22; see also infra Part III.A. 
6
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gan by applying corporate principles of piercing the corporate veil 
when evaluating claims to pierce an LLC.  The complete lack of stat-
utory guidance on the factors necessary to pierce LLCs leaves judges 
with tremendous discretion, resulting in some uneven and sometimes 
insupportable results.33 
Part II of this Article explores the history of LLC veil piercing 
doctrine, starting with an exploration of the approach set out in the 
Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (“RULLCA”) and 
a brief look at the approaches states take to piercing the LLC veil, 
with a close examination of the NYLLCA.34  Part III reviews the 
New York case law on piercing the corporate veil and the evolution 
of this doctrine by state and federal courts in the context of LLCs.  
The article concludes with some suggestions for refining the continu-
ing development of the LLC piercing doctrine in New York in a 
thoughtful and deliberate manner so as to avoid inconsistent and arbi-
trary results. 
II. HISTORY OF THE LLC VEIL PIERCING DOCTRINE 
By 1996, every state had some sort of LLC legislation.  This 
timing is likely tied to the work of the Uniform Law Commission 
(ULC)35 which in 1995, promulgated the original Uniform Limited 
 
33 According to Professor Bainbridge: 
Courts are now routinely applying the corporate law doctrine of veil 
piercing to limited liability companies (LLCs).  This extension of a seri-
ously flawed doctrine into a new arena is not required by statute and is 
insupportable as a matter of policy.  The standards by which veil pierc-
ing is effected are vague, leaving judges great discretion.  The result has 
been uncertainty and lack predictability . . . 
Bainbridge supra note 24, at 77. 
 According to another commentator: 
A common refrain in the literature is an attack on the use of conclusory 
terms, such as “alter ego” and “instrumentality,” providing no insight in-
to the nature of the factors considered.  Commentators lament that the 
same facts appear in cases providing relief and cases denying relief in an 
unpatterned mingling of relevant with neutral facts that has stymied con-
structive analysis.  The law is presented as offering completely antithet-
ical doctrines which courts are at liberty to utilize or ignore, depending 
on the results desired. 
Thompson, supra note 1, at 1037.  See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the New York 
courts’ issues with terminology. 
34 LTD. LIAB. § 609(a). 
35 The ULC is also known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Law.  The organization was created in 1892 and according to the organization—it pro-
7
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Liability Company Act (ULLCA),36 blending concepts from partner-
ship and corporate law.37  Since LLCs are a combination of corpora-
tions and partnerships, it is unsurprising that the ULC and state legis-
lators have leaned on both corporate and partnership statutory norms 
in crafting structures to govern this hybrid. 
A. Revised Uniform Limited Liability Act 
In 2006, the ULC released the Revised Uniform Limited Lia-
bility Company Act,38 a “comprehensive, fully integrated ‘second 
generation’ LLC statute that takes into account the best elements of 
the ‘first generation’ LLC statutes and two decades of legal develop-
ments in the field.”39
  
On the topic of limited liability for owners, the 
RULLCA provides a blanket statement disclaiming member-liability 
arising “solely” by reason of the membership in the LLC.40  This 
 
vides states with “non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted legislation that brings clari-
ty and stability to critical areas of state statutory law.”  See About the ULC, UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N, http://www.uniformlawcommission.com/Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the%20 
ULC (last visited Mar. 13, 2015). 
36 This first-generation model LLC act was amended in 1996 to take into account the then 
newly adopted federal tax “check-the-box” regulations.  See 26 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 
(2014).  See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
37 According to the ULC: 
ULLCA’s drafting relied substantially on the then recently adopted Re-
vised Uniform Partnership Act (“RUPA”), and this reliance was espe-
cially heavy with regard to member-managed LLCs.  ULLCA’s provi-
sions for manager-managed LLCs comprised an amalgam fashioned 
from the 1985 Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (“RULPA”) 
and the Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”).  ULLCA’s provi-
sions were also significantly influenced by the then-applicable federal 
tax classification regulations, which classified an unincorporated organi-
zation as a corporation if the organization more nearly resembled a cor-
poration than a partnership. 
REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT (2006) (prefatory note). 
38 REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT. 
39 See supra note 35. 
40 See REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 304.  Section 304, Liability of Members and Man-
agers reads as follows: 
(a) The debts, obligations, or other liabilities of a limited liability com-
pany, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise: 
(1) are solely the debts, obligations, or other liabilities of the com-
pany; and 
(2) do not become the debts, obligations, or other liabilities of a 
member or manager solely by reason of the member acting as a member 
or manager acting as a manager. 
8
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leaves open the possibility of liability for owners for matters that do 
not arise “solely” from their ownership status.  The ULC comments 
provide context on this issue, indicating that the intent is to shield 
members and managers from obligations of the LLC, but not to re-
lease them from claims arising from their own bad conduct.41 
While this is entirely consistent with the MBCA and corpo-
rate law principles generally, the reality is that LLCs are not corpora-
tions, although they share many characteristics.  A doctrine that is 
appropriate for corporations may not be appropriate for the hybrid 
LLC.  Yet, the ULC treats LLCs exactly like corporations in almost 
all respects.  The exception is in the need to adhere to company for-
malities.  The ULC comment notes the importance placed on the 
“disregard of corporate formalities”42 in a corporate piercing analysis, 
and argues that this factor is inappropriate when considering piercing 
an LLC, “because informality of organization and operation is both 
common and desired.”43  A number of states, not including New 
York, have picked up this idea and have legislatively eliminated or 
diminished the importance of adhering to formalities as a part of an 
LLC piercing analysis.44 
The ULC has missed an opportunity to offer needed clarity 
and guidance on when and how this corporate law concept of limited 
liability could and should be eroded in the context of LLCs.  The 
drafters implicitly noted the need for this guidance, when comment-
ing that courts “regularly (and sometimes almost reflexively) apply 
 
(b) The failure of a limited liability company to observe any particular 
formalities relating to the exercise of its powers or management of its ac-
tivities is not a ground for imposing liability on the members or manag-
ers for the debts, obligations, or other liabilities of the company. 
Id. 
41 See id. (comment on § 304). 
42 Id. (comment on § 304). 
43 Id. (comment on § 304). 
44 See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.  Professor Bahls cites the Comments of 
the Limited Liability Company Subcommittee on this issue: 
The failure of a limited liability company to observe the formalities cus-
tomarily followed by business corporations or requirements relating to 
the exercise of its powers or management of its business and affairs is 
not a ground for courts disregarding the separate entity status of [a lim-
ited liability company] or for imposing personal liability on the members 
for liabilities of the limited liability company.  Courts should not pierce 
the limited liability company “veil” merely as a result of failure to follow 
normal formalities required of a corporation. 
Bahls, supra note 18, at 63 n.115. 
9
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that doctrine to limited liability companies.”45  This is far from a ring-
ing endorsement of the appropriateness of such applications; yet the 
ULC offers no substantive help to counter the “reflexive” application 
of the doctrine to LLCs.  Many courts follow the ULC approach and 
treat LLCs exactly like corporations.  They may do so intentionally or 
perhaps carelessly, but in any event, they weaken the logic supporting 
the developing LLC piercing case law.46 
B. State Statutory Approaches to LLC Piercing 
States have reacted to the RULLCA’s implicit authorization 
of the LLC veil piercing with a variety of statutory approaches.  
There are language differences between and among the various state 
LLC statutes, in terms of how each limits member liability for LLC 
debts.47  No state statute expressly addresses the issue of piercing.  
The case law bears out that this should not be interpreted to mean that 
the relevant lawmakers in fact intended that the doctrine not apply.48 
In 1997, Professor Thompson categorized state LLC laws into 
sometimes overlapping groups, based on the degree and scope of in-
sulation each provided.49  His first group of LLC statutes contained 
language that insulates members from any and all liabilities of the 
LLC.50  His second group of LLC statutes limits this protection to li-
abilities arising from members acting as members, or for liabilities 
arising “solely” from the members’ status, with various iterations of 
 
45 REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 304 (comment on § 304). 
46 See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. 
47 In 1997, Professor Thompson did a comprehensive survey of the states’ LLC laws.  At 
that time, he found the various states’ liability provisions to be “much less uniform than par-
allel provisions in corporate statutes and some LLC statutes arguably create broader insula-
tion than is currently available at corporate law.”  Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liabil-
ity in the New Limited Liability Entities, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 14 (1997). 
48 Kaycee Land & Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.2d 323, 327 (Wyo. 2002); see also Bahls, 
supra note 18, at 61. 
49 See Thompson, supra note 47, at 14-18. 
50 Id. at 14-15.  Of the thirteen states in Professor Thompson’s Category A (insulating 
from liability with no “specific reference to any limits on the insulation”), nine would still be 
in that category.  See Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-304 (West 1993)); Colorado (COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 7-80-705 (West 1990)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4227 (West 2002)); 
Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1320 (West 1993)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 450.4501(4) (West 2010)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.371 (West 1995)); 
Texas (TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE § 101.114 (Vernon 2006)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-
601 (West 2001)); and Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-304 (West 2010)). 
10
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who other than members are entitled to this protection.51  Another 
group of LLC statutes indicates that despite the statute’s protection, 
members can become liable as a result of their own conduct.52  And 
finally, a handful of LLC statutes expressly piggybacked their LLC 
protection onto such states’ existing corporate law protection by ref-
erencing their corporate law principles, and legislating that LLC 
members should be treated like shareholders in a corporation.53 
 
51 Thompson, supra note 47, at 17.  Of the twenty-nine states in Professor Thompson’s 
Categories B and C (insulating from liability arising “solely” from specified activities or 
membership status), twenty-eight would still be in that category and five more from other 
categories should now be included here.  See Alaska (ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 10.50.265 (West 
1997)); Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-651 (West 1992)); California (CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 17703.04 (2014)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-133 (West 1997)); 
Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 6 § 18-303 (West 1994)); District of Columbia (D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 29-803.04 (West 2013)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-303 (West 2009)); Hawaii 
(HAW. REV. STAT. § 428-303 (1996)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6-304 (West 2008)); 
Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.150 (West 2012)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT., tit. 31 § 
1544 (2011); Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-301 (West 1992)); Massa-
chusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 156C § 22 (2003)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
322B.303 (1993)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE. ANN. § 79-29-311 (West 2011)); Missouri (MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 347.057 (Vernon 1993)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-304 (West 
2013)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:23 (2013)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 42:2C-30 (2012) (no longer covers agents)); New York (N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. Law § 
609(a) (McKinney 1994)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-32-29 (West 1993)); 
Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18 § 2022 (1992)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.165 
(West 1999)); Pennsylvania (15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8922 (Purdon 2001)); Rhode Island 
(R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-16-23 (West 1992)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-303 
(1996)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1019 (West 2006)); and West Virginia (W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 31B-3-303 (West 1996)). 
 The following four statutes now fall into Categories B and C: Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 
489.304 (2009)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7688 (West 2014)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 21-129 (West 2011)); and South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A-303 
(1998)).  And the Washington statute does not provide insulation for members or managers 
and should no longer be in this category.  See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.060 (West 
1995). 
52 Thompson, supra note 47, at 17.  Of the eight states in Professor Thompson’s Category 
D (including an affirmative statement that participants can become liable through their own 
conduct), nine would still be in that category.  North Carolina should also be moved to Cate-
gories B and C from Category D (N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 57D-3-30 (West 2014)).  See Ala-
bama (ALA. CODE § 10A-5-3.02 (2009); this statute will be repealed as of January 1, 2017); 
Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-3-3 (West 1993)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-217-
101 (West 2012)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-13 (West 1993)); Ohio (OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.48 (West 2010)); Vermont (11 VT. STAT. ANN. § 3043); and Wis-
consin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.0304 (West 2013)). 
53 Thompson, supra note 47, at 17.  Of the seven states in Professor Thompson’s Category 
E(1) and (2) (explicitly requiring corporate principles to LLCs), five would still be in that 
category: California (CAL. CORP. CODE § 17703.04(2)(b)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
322B.303); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-32-29(3)); Washington (WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 25.15.060); and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.0304).  Neither the Hawaii 
statute (HAW. REV. STAT. § 428-303) nor the Illinois statute (805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
11
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This latter approach has arguably the benefit of being easy to 
apply.  That said, depending on how clearly and consistently articu-
lated the relevant state corporate piercing doctrine is, the seemingly 
easy application of corporate law piercing principles to LLCs may 
not be terribly helpful.  And even in the absence of express statutory 
authority mandating the application of corporate piercing factors to 
LLCs, many courts implicitly do so,54 engaging in what Professor 
Bainbridge calls a “perfunctory” analysis, where these courts “simply 
assume the corporate law standard applies and have done with it.”55  
These courts fail to consider any differences at all between corpora-
tions and LLCs.56 
C. New York’s Limited Liability Company Law 
The New York Limited Liability Company Law 
(“NYLLCL”) became law on July 26, 1994, and under § 1403 there-
of, became law 90 days later.57  The law is a blend of New York part-
nership and corporate law.58  The law was designed to make New 
 
180/10-10) contains such a provision.  See HAW. REV. STAT. § 428-303; 805 ILCS 180/10-10.  
For further discussion on the change in Illinois’ law, see Chad Brigham, Just How Limited is 
the Illinois Limited Liability Company?, 26 S. ILL. L.J. 53, 55 (2001). 
54 Bainbridge, supra note 24, at 82 (citing Stone v. Frederick Hobby Assoc. II, No. 
CV000181620S, 2001 WL 861822, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 10, 2001); Advanced Tel. 
Sys. Inc. v. Com-Net Prof’l Mobile Radio LLC, 59 Pa. D. & C.4th 286, 289 (Pa. Ct. Com. 
Pl. 2002)). 
55 Bainbridge, supra note 24, at 82; Thompson, supra note 47, at 17. 
56 Some states have followed the RULLCA’s exclusion of a failure to follow corporate 
formalities as grounds for piercing.  Professor Thompson’s Category E(3) lists nine statutes 
that carve out provisions of corporate law from LLC piercing.  Two states have come out of 
this category; Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-705) no longer has such a provision, 
and neither does Maine (ME. REV. STAT. tit. 31, § 1544).  The remaining seven states are 
joined by another eight states in carving out failure to follow company formalities as grounds 
for liability.  See California (CAL. CORP. CODE § 17703.04 (2)(b)); District of Columbia 
(D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-803.04); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 428-303); Illinois (805 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/10-10); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 489.304(2)); Oregon (OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 63.165); Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6-304); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 
35-8-304); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2C-30); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-
44-303); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A-303(b)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 48-217-101); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.060); West Virginia (W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 31B-3-303); Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-304(b)). 
57 Memorandum from the Office of G. Oliver Koppell, New York Attorney General to 
Attorneys, Paralegals & Law Students (Dec. 7, 1994), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/ 
sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/real_estate_finance/Effective-memos/E-34.%20Limited 
%20liability%20company%20law.pdf (providing an overview of New York’s Limited Lia-
bility Company Law). 
58 “The law is based on existing New York law and practice, borrowing heavily from ex-
12
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York “aggressively hospitable to business.”59  The NYLLCL had sig-
nificant support; the Legislative Bill and Veto Jacket for the 
NYLLCA contains a variety of memoranda in support of the bill to-
taling over 200 pages.60 
The introduction to the NYLLCL indicates that it is amending 
“the partnership law, the business corporation law, the arts and cul-
tural affairs law, the tax law, the general city law, the administrative 
code of the city of New York, the codes and ordinances of the city of 
Yonkers and the public health law, in relation to limited liability 
companies and the registration of limited liability partnerships.”61 
Section 609 contains a modified version of the RULLCA, 
providing that members and managers of LLCs are not liable for the 
debts and obligations of the LLC “solely” by reason of such status.62  
The statute has been cited in fifty-two New York cases, many of 
which for the proposition that individual owners are not responsible 
for LLC debts.63 
The text of § 609 has not changed in the twenty years since its 
 
isting New York Partnership Law, especially the recently enacted New York Revised Lim-
ited Liability Partnership Act . . . and where applicable the Business Corporation Law.”  See 
New York Bill Jacket, 1994 S.B. 7511-A, Ch. 576, at 00006 (memorandum in support of 
S.B. 7511-A). 
59 See id. at 000032 (memorandum filed with S.B. 7511-A).  “Unlike partnerships, how-
ever, the LLC offers one major non-tax benefit which will make it a very desirable form of 
business organization.  This is the protection of members for the debts and other obligations 
of the LLC.”  Id. at 000029. 
60 The Legislative Bill and Jacket Veto contains only one explicit reference to § 609, in a 
letter from the State Education Department to the Counsel to the Governor, raising concerns 
not about § 609, but rather about how the bill applies to various professions licensed under 
the Education Law.  See id. at 00052 (Memorandum from the State Education Department to 
the Counsel to the Governor). 
61 Limited Liability Company Law, 1994 Sess. Law News of N.Y., Ch. 576 (S. 7511–A, 
A. 11317–A) (McKinney). 
62 See LTD. LIAB. § 609(a).  Section 609(a) reads: 
(a) Neither a member of a limited liability company, a manager of a lim-
ited liability company managed by a manager or managers nor an agent 
of a limited liability company (including a person having more than one 
such capacity) is liable for any debts, obligations or liabilities of the lim-
ited liability company or each other, whether arising in tort, contract or 
otherwise, solely by reason of being such member, manager or agent or 
acting (or omitting to act) in such capacities or participating (as an em-
ployee, consultant, contractor or otherwise) in the conduct of the busi-
ness of the limited liability company. 
Id. 
63 See, e.g., Broadway 26 Waterview LLC v. Bainton, McCarthy & Siegel, LLC, 941 
N.Y.S.2d 620 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2012). 
13
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enactment.  However, various bills have been proposed to amend the 
section, most recently, the 2013 New York Senate Bill No. 5885 
which proposed adding provisions to increase penalties for wage 
payment violations by LLCs.64  The bill requires that the ten mem-
bers with the largest percentage ownership in an LLC be personally 
liable for all debts, wages, or salaries due and owing to any of its la-
borers, servants or employees, for services performed by them for 
such limited liability company.  The legislative history for the pro-
posed amendment offers this justification: 
The Wage Theft Prevention Act was enacted in 2010 
to provide the Department of Labor with the tools 
necessary to ensure that workers across the State of 
New York are paid the wages to which they are enti-
tled.  However, many employees are still vulnerable to 
wage theft by unscrupulous employers.  This bill 
would better ensure that all New York workers receive 
the wages they have rightfully earned.65 
This proposed bill reflects legislative effort to further move LLCs 
towards the corporation part of their hybrid nature, as New York’s 
BCL § 630 contains a similar provision holding the ten largest corpo-
rate shareholders personally liable for debts, wages and salaries owed 
to employees.66  This effort to move LLCs further in alignment with 
New York corporate law may prove to be insignificant as the legisla-
tive history of the bill notes that a bill similar to 5885 died in the La-
bor Committee in both Houses. 
III. NEW YORK LLC PIERCING CASES 
A. Piercing the Corporate Veil under New York Law 
The doctrine of piercing corporations is well-established un-
der New York case law.  Morris v. N.Y. State Department of Taxation 
& Finance67 is a leading New York Court of Appeals case setting out 
the elements of a successful corporate piercing claim, providing that 
 
64  S.B. 5885, 2013 Leg., 237th Sess. (N.Y. 2013). 
65
 NEW YORK COMMITTEE REPORT, S.B. 5885, 2013 Leg., 237th Sess. (N.Y. 2013). 
66 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 630 (McKinney 1984). 
67 623 N.E.2d 1157 (N.Y. 1993). 
14
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courts may pierce the corporate veil and erode or eliminate share-
holder limited liability when necessary “to prevent fraud or achieve 
equity.”68  That said, corporate piercing is not undertaken lightly in 
New York.69  New York courts will pierce the corporate veil and hold 
shareholders liable for the corporation’s debts only when “(1) the 
owners exercised complete domination of the corporation in respect 
to the transaction attacked; and (2) that such domination was used to 
commit a fraud or wrong against the plaintiff which resulted in plain-
tiff’s injury.”70 
The decision to pierce is a fact-intensive one, with no bright-
line test or rigid rules available to achieve consistent results.71  Mor-
ris offers no guidance on how to apply its two prongs, and so several 
case law tests have been developed to fill that gap.  New York courts 
consider a number of factors that support a finding of the domination 
or unity of interest required to pierce a corporate veil under Morris.72  
 
68 Id. at 1160 (quoting Int’l Aircraft Trading Co. v. Mfrs. Trust Co., 79 N.E.2d 249, 252 
(N.Y. 1948)). 
69 According to one district court judge, “New York courts are reluctant to disregard the 
corporate form, and will do so only when it ‘has been used to achieve fraud, or when the 
corporation has been so dominated by an individual or corporation . . . and its separate iden-
tity so disregarded, that it primarily transacted the dominator’s business rather than its own 
and can be called the other’s alter ego.’ ”  Allison v. Clos-ette Too, LLC, No. 14 Civ. 
1618(LAK)(JCF), 2014 WL 4996358, at *5 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 15, 2014) (quoting Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc. v. Recovery Credit Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 13, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
70 Morris, 623 N.E.2d at 1160-61.  The federal courts frame the issue slightly differently: 
A party urging piercing of a corporate veil must generally prove that “(1) 
the owner has exercised such control that the corporation has become a 
mere instrumentality of the owner, which is the real actor; (2) such con-
trol has been used to commit a fraud or other wrong; and (3) the fraud or 
wrong results in an unjust loss or injury to plaintiff.”   
Freeman v. Complex Computing Co., 119 F.3d 1044, 1052 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Wm Pas-
salacqua Builders, 933 F.2d at 138). 
71 “Because a decision to pierce the corporate veil in any given instance will necessarily 
depend on the attendant facts and equities, the New York cases may not be reduced to defini-
tive rules governing the varying circumstances when this power may be exercised.”  Morris, 
623 N.E.2d at 1160.  And because the inquiry is so fact-intensive, the theory of veil piercing 
“is not well suited for resolution on a pre-answer, pre-discovery motion to dismiss.”  BT 
Ams. Inc. v. ProntoCom Mktg. Inc., 859 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2008). 
72 Wm. Passalacqua Builders, 933 F.2d at 139.  The factors include: 
(1) the absence of the formalities and paraphernalia that are part and par-
cel of the corporate existence, i.e., issuance of stock, election of direc-
tors, keeping of corporate records and the like, (2) inadequate capitaliza-
tion, (3) whether funds are put in and taken out of the corporation for 
personal rather than corporate purposes, (4) overlap in ownership, offic-
ers, directors, and personnel, (5) common office space, address and tele-
phone numbers of corporate entities, (6) the amount of business discre-
15
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The factors set out in Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick De-
velopers South, Inc.73 have been used in various iterations by both the 
New York state and federal courts.74  The Second Circuit has noted 
that there is no “mechanical” rule to dictate how many or to what de-
gree the piercing factors must be present, and further that courts will 
apply the “overarching principle” that liability will be imposed to 
reach an equitable result.75  Accordingly, courts utilize varying num-
bers of the Passalacqua factors when evaluating piercing claims.76 
As previously noted, one area where corporate piercing doc-
trine differs from LLC piercing is in the need to follow company 
formalities; whether corporate shareholders are following requisite 
corporate formalities is the first of the Passalacqua factors.77  When a 
corporate shareholder fails to follow basic corporate formalities, it 
becomes unfair to require creditors to honor the separate nature of the 
corporation when its owner has not done the same.
 78  Some state 
 
tion displayed by the allegedly dominated corporation, (7) whether the 
related corporations deal with the dominated corporation at arms length, 
(8) whether the corporations are treated as independent profit centers, (9) 
the payment or guarantee of debts of the dominated corporation by other 
corporations in the group, and (10) whether the corporation in question 
had property that was used by other of the corporations as if it were its 
own. 
Id. 
73 933 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1991). 
74 See Last Time Beverage Corp. v. F & V Distribution Co., LLC, 951 N.Y.S.2d 77 (App. 
Div. 2d Dep’t 2012); East Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Sandpebble Builders, Inc., 884 
N.Y.S.2d 94 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2009); BT Americas Inc., 859 N.Y.S.2d 893.  Courts can 
select only a few of the Passalacqua factors.  See, e.g., Bd. of Managers of Caton Court 
Condo. v. Caton Dev. LP, 983 N.Y.S.2d 201, 41 Misc.3d 1231(A), at *8 (Sup. Ct. Kings 
County 2013) (“Factors to be considered in determining whether an individual has abused 
the privilege of doing business in the corporate or LLC form include the failure to adhere to 
LLC formalities, inadequate capitalization, commingling of assets, and the personal use of 
LLC funds.” (internal citations omitted)). 
75 Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Recovery Credit Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 
1996). 
76 See, e.g., Bd. of Managers of Caton, 983 N.Y.S.2d 201.  Commentators have weighed 
in with proposed factors tests designed for the specifics of piercing LLCs.  See Cohen, supra 
note 13, at 490-91.  See also John H. Matheson & Raymond B. Eby, The Doctrine of Pierc-
ing the Veil in an Era of Multiple Limited Liability Entities: An Opportunity to Codify the 
Test for Waiving Owners’ Limited Liability Protection, 75 WASH. L. REV. 147, 156 (2000). 
77 Wm. Passalacqua Builders, 933 F.2d at 139. 
78 According to the Second Circuit: 
Application of these many precedents to the literally infinite variety of 
situations which might warrant a court to pierce the corporate veil can be 
difficult, particularly in the case of small privately held corporations 
where the trappings of sophisticated corporate life are rarely present.  In 
16
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statutes, and the RULLCA, explicitly carve out failure to follow cor-
porate formalities from the list of factors to consider when piercing 
an LLC.79  The NYLLCL does not do so, but some New York courts 
have weighed in on the decreased need for adherence to formalities in 
the context of an LLC.
 80 
B. Piercing the LLC Veil under New York Case Law 
Unlike a small number of other states, the NYLLCL does not 
expressly authorize the whole scale application of corporate veil 
piercing to LLCs.81  Instead, § 609 provides that members of LLCs 
are not liable for the company’s debts solely because of their owner 
status.82  Although the language of the statute contains no limitations 
on this liability protection, New York courts began hearing claims to 
pierce LLCs within a few years of the enactment of § 609.  In the ab-
sence of direction from the legislature, courts have been left to their 
own devices when adjudicating these claims.  Almost ten years after 
the enactment of § 609, one court implicitly acknowledged the con-
tinuing lack of clarity in this area, and to support its view that it 
seems “likely that a corporate standard would be applied” to LLC 
piercing cases, the court had to reference a “learned treatise” for the 
proposition that LLC members ought to have the same protections as 
 
such instances, preoccupation with questions of structure, financial and 
accounting sophistication or dividend policy or history would inevitably 
beckon the end of limited liability for small business owners, many, if 
not most, of whom have chosen the corporate form to shield themselves 
from unlimited liability and potential financial ruin.  Nevertheless, a 
close examination of the many cases reveals common characteristics 
broadly utilized by reviewing courts in deciding whether to disregard the 
corporate form.  In each case, the evidence demonstrated an abuse of that 
form either through on-going fraudulent activities of a principal, or a 
pronounced and intimate commingling of identities of the corporation 
and its principal or principals, which prompted the reviewing courts, 
driven by equity, to disregard the corporate form. 
William Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Waters, 890 F.2d 594, 601 (2d Cir. 1989). 
79 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
80 Capricorn Investors III, L.P. v. Coolbrands Int’l, Inc., 897 N.Y.S.2d 668, 24 Misc. 3d 
1224(A), at *5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2009) (“LLCs generally have operating agreements, 
which may include meeting requirements, or other such formalities.  Plaintiff’s assertion that 
the LLCs have no officers or directors, and did not hold board or executive committee meet-
ings are not persuasive veil piercing factors for an LLC, where plaintiff does not argue that 
management was required to be centralized in a board.”). 
81 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
82 LTD. LIAB. § 609(a). 
17
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corporate shareholders.83 
Since 2005, New York case law has explicitly provided that 
its LLCs are subject to piercing.84  What is unclear, and somewhat in-
consistent, is both the approaches courts take when evaluating LLC 
piercing claims, and in some cases, the elements required to pierce an 
LLC.85  The early LLC piercing cases relied on Morris for the propo-
sition that piercing was permitted in the LLC context, anchoring their 
analysis around Morris’ two prongs, presumably as a matter of equi-
ty.  The courts also use some variation of the Passalacqua factors for 
this very fact-intensive evaluation.86  To date, no court has offered 
context or justification for the application of these corporate law 
principles to an LLC.87  This could be an intentional choice by these 
courts, concluding that in the context of piercing, LLCs are more like 
corporations than partnerships.  Morris’ goal “to prevent fraud or 
achieve equity” was not anchored to a corporate landscape.88  Or it 
could be, as Professor Bainbridge said, that the courts are just assum-
ing corporate piercing principles do apply.89 
 
83 Zulawski v. Taylor, 815 N.Y.S.2d 496, 11 Misc. 3d 1058(A), at *4 (Sup. Ct. Erie Coun-
ty 2005) (citing 1 N.Y. PRAC., NEW YORK LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND PARTNERSHIPS 
§ 3.3).  One court did just what the “learned treatise” drafters had suggested and explicitly 
held that the corporate law of piercing applies to LLCs.  See Retropolis Inc. v. 14th St. Dev. 
LLC, 797 N.Y.S.2d 1, 17 A.D.3d 201, 211 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2005). 
84 See Retropolis, 17 A.D.3d at 211. 
85 “In light of the predominant trend for courts to import the corporate law regime into the 
LLC context, it is not surprising that a similar multitude of standards is emerging in the latter 
setting.”  Bainbridge, supra note 24, at 87. 
86 The district court in Jiaxing Hongyu Knitting v. Morgan, No. 11 Civ. 09342(AJN), 
2013 WL 81320 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2013), relied on William Wrigley Jr. Co., 890 F.2d at 601, 
for the list of factors, which is much shorter than full Passalacqua list: 
A court may consider several factors in making this determination: (1) 
the intermingling of corporate and personal funds, (2) undercapitaliza-
tion of the corporation, and (3) failure to maintain separate books and 
records or other formal legal requirements for the corporation.  While 
there is no set rule as to how many of these factors must be present in 
order to pierce the corporate veil, the general principle followed by the 
courts has been that liability is imposed when doing so would achieve an 
equitable result. 
890 F.2d 594, 600-01 (internal citations omitted). 
87 See also Williams Oil Co., v. Randy Luce E-Z Mart One, LLC, 757 N.Y.S.2d 341, 302 
A.D.2d 736, 739 (App Div. 3d Dep’t 2003) (holding that piercing may be appropriate to hold 
the general manager of an LLC liable if the two prong test articulated by the Morris court is 
satisfied, offering no justification for applying this corporate law concept to an LLC). 
88 Morris, 623 N.E.2d at 1160 (quoting Int’l Aircraft Trading Co., 79 N.E.2d at 252). 
89 Bainbridge, supra note 24, at 82; Thompson, supra note 47, at 17.  Some states have 
followed the RULLCA’s exclusion of a failure to follow corporate formalities as grounds for 
piercing.  Professor Thompson’s Category E(3) lists nine statutes that carve out provisions of 
18
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The hybrid nature of the LLC reflects both its corporate and 
its partnership law characteristics.  New York courts seem to have 
latched on to the hybrid nature of LLCs, initially borrowing corporate 
veil piercing principles to adjudicate LLC piercing claims until case 
law began to establish a body of LLC veil piercing doctrine.  During 
this evolution, courts have continually overlapped corporate, partner-
ship, and LLC terminology in LLC piercing cases. Some courts were 
careful with their language, and did not mix corporate and LLC ter-
minology.90  The word choice of other courts seemingly blended 
LLCs into some variation of a corporation by incorrectly using corpo-
rate law terminology when evaluating LLCs piercing claims.91  While 
 
corporate law from LLC piercing.  Two states have come out of this category.  Colorado no 
longer has such a provision, and neither does Maine.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-705); 
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 31 § 1544.  The remaining seven states are joined by another eight states 
in carving out failure to follow company formalities as grounds for liability.  See California 
(CAL. CORP. CODE § 17703.04 (2(b)); District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-803.04); 
Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 428-303); Illinois (805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/10-10); Iowa 
(IOWA CODE § 489.304(2)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.165); Idaho (IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 30-6-304); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-304); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
42:2C-30); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-303); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 47-34A-303(b)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-217-101); Washington (WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.060); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31B-3-303); Wyoming 
(WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-304(b)). 
90 The Supreme Court, Kings County, chose its words carefully and correctly when it said 
“generally, a corporation (or in this case, a limited liability company) exists independently of 
its owners (members) who are not personally liable for corporate obligations.”  Kleinman v. 
Blue Ridge Foods, LLC, 934 N.Y.S.2d 34, 32 Misc. 3d 1219(A), at *9 (Sup. Ct. Kings 
County 2011). 
91 See, e.g., Clos-Ette Too, LLC, 2014 WL 4996358, at *6 (noting the LLC status of de-
fendant Clos-Ette, LLC, yet referring to the LLC as a corporation and to the individual de-
fendant as a “corporate” officer); Am. Federated Title Corp. v. GFI Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 
13-cv-6437 (AJN), 2014 WL 4058236, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014) (referring to the LLC 
as “the dominated corporation” and evaluating whether the LLC had an “independent corpo-
rate purpose”); 501 Fifth Ave. v. Alvona, 973 N.Y.S.2d 137, 138 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2013) 
(noting the “individual defendants are not owners of the corporate defendant” when referring 
to the LLC); Conason v. Megan Holdings, LLC, 972 N.Y.S.2d 223, 226 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 
2013) (finding the lower court properly pierced the “corporate veil” and that there was evi-
dence that the individual defendant had “abandoned the corporate form”); Millennium Con-
str., LLC v. Loupolover, 845 N.Y.S.2d 110, 44 A.D.3d 1016, 1016 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 
2007) (finding no basis to pierce the LLC and hold the “sole shareholder” liable); Kamar v. 
AKW Holdings, LLC, 859 N.Y.S.2d 903, 19 Misc. 3d 1113(A), at *10 (Sup. Ct. Kings 
County 2008) (referring to the “corporate” veil of the entity sought to be pierced). 
 In Jiaxing Hongyu Knitting Co. v. Allison Morgan LLC, No. 11 Civ. 09342(AJN), 2013 
WL 81320 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2013), the court notes one party’s “fundamental misunderstand-
ing of the law” in raising an equitable estoppel claim.  Id. at *8.  Yet this court, when evalu-
ating whether to pierce an LLC, never mentions the LLC status of the defendant, referring to 
the entity as “the corporate defendant” and a corporation, and to the owner as a “controlling 
shareholder.”  Id. 
19
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these distinctions are arguably a matter of semantics, they are illustra-
tive of at least an underlying failure to facially see LLCs as an entity 
separate and apart from corporations.92 
The first cases under § 609 were decided in 2001.  The courts 
in these early cases ignored the need for any discussion on whether 
the LLCs could be pierced, and simply applied the corporate piercing 
rules as if the LLC was instead a corporation; they offered no context 
or support for their choice, never even noting that the entity sought to 
be pierced was an LLC and not a corporation.  These opinions read as 
if the entity in question was a New York corporation.  For example, 
the 2001 case NetTech Solutions, LLC v. ZipPark.com,93 the first re-
ported New York case to explore the application of piercing to LLCs, 
reads like a corporate veil piercing case.94  In evaluating the LLC 
piercing claim, the district court relied on the traditional corporate 
law concept of piercing with the same two prongs required by Mor-
ris, and found that the required domination was both present and used 
to commit a wrongdoing.95  Thus, the court refused to dismiss a con-
tract claim against the individual defendant.  The court offered no 
support, context, or rationale for its decision to apply corporate law to 
 
 In an action to recover rent allegedly owed by an LLC, the court comments that “[n]one 
of the proposed individual defendants, former partners of defendant, were signatories to the 
original lease, and thus they cannot be held liable for the rent arrears.”  Broadway 26 Water-
view LLC v. Bainton, McCarthy & Siegel, 941 N.Y.S.2d 620, 620 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 
2012).  Since the defendant is an LLC, it is not possible for any of these proposed individual 
defendants to be “partners” of the defendant LLC. 
 The district court in Michaels v. Banks fails to differentiate between LLCs or corpora-
tions in its determination of whether to pierce.  The court noted that “[b]ecause the breached 
contract for which plaintiffs seek damages was between plaintiffs and a corporate entity, 
Aloha LLC, Banks and Kingston will be liable only if the Aloha LLC corporate veil is 
pierced, making them individually responsible.”  Michaels v. Banks, 901 F. Supp. 2d 354, 
357 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (emphasis added).  Thus, the court included an LLC as a “corporate 
entity,” which arguably supports its decision to rely exclusively on corporate law to adjudi-
cate the LLC piercing claim. 
 In Matias ex rel. Palma v. Mondo Properties LLC, 841 N.Y.S.2d 279 (App. Div. 1st 
Dep’t 2007), the court is careful in its only footnote to correct the caption of the case, saying 
that defendant WDJ Realty VI LLC was “incorrectly identified in the caption as WDJ Realty 
IV Corp.” Id. at 280 n.1.  Yet that same court refers to an interest in the defendant compa-
nies, as “an officer and a shareholder” of the entities.  Id. 
92 Professor Bainbridge refers to this as “an irresistible impulse.”  See Bainbridge, supra 
note 24, at 82. 
93 NetTech Solutions, LLC v. ZipPark.com, No. 01 Civ. 2683(SAS), 2001 WL 1111966 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001). 
94 See id. 
95 Oddly, the court cited Cary Oil v. MG Refining & Mktg., Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 401, 415 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), rather than Morris. 
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an LLC, seemingly believing that the corporate law of piercing was 
available in its entirety to LLCs.96 
The court in Westmoreland Associates, LLC v. Kispert97 was 
the first to specifically reference § 609(a) and offer any justification 
for piercing an LLC veil.  The court noted that despite the protections 
of § 609(a), “if a corporate veil can be pierced under appropriate cir-
cumstances, an LLC veil should be piercable [sic] as well.”98  The 
court relied on Morris for the idea that piercing is an equitable reme-
dy, and that it should be used to prevent fraud or injustice, not just by 
owners of corporations.99  While the court is to be commended for of-
fering some support for its extension of corporate veil piercing doc-
trine to LLCs, and while it is also true that, as the court points out, the 
petitioner’s corporate or LLC status is irrelevant to whether there ex-
ists sufficient domination that is used to commit fraud or injustice, 
the fact remains that LLCs are not corporations.100  And to apply cor-
porate law to LLCs in a manner that Professor Bainbridge would call 
“unthinking” may be ill advised.101 
The 2005 Appellate Division decision, Retropolis, Inc. v. 14th 
Street Development LLC,102 clearly and completely eliminated any 
doubt that piercing LLCs is permissible under New York law.103  The 
Retropolis court said “Plaintiff seeks to avoid the statutory bar to 
such a cause of action by using the doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil, which applies to limited liability companies.”104  However, the 
Retropolis court fails to offer context, precedent, or other support for 
its conclusion, other than a “see e.g.,” reference to Williams Oil Co., 
Inc. v. Randy Luce E-Z Mart One, LLC.105  This reliance seems odd, 
 
96 NetTech Solutions, LLC, 2001 WL 1111966, at *11. 
97 Westmoreland Assocs., LLC v. Kisper, No. 082774/99, 2002 WL 31777885 (N.Y. City 
Civ. Ct. Queens County Sept. 20, 2002). 
98 Id. at *4. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. (“[T]he corporate or LLC status of the petitioner is irrelevant.  Petitioner is a land-
lord regardless of whether it’s a corporation, LLC or natural person.”). 
101 Bainbridge, supra note 24, at 78-79 (“The obvious question is whether courts should 
export the corporate veil piercing doctrine to the LLC context.  Some LLC statutes seem to 
command the courts to do so.  Even in the absence of such a statutory command, however, 
courts are routinely applying the corporate law doctrine to LLCs.  Most are doing so in a 
way that can only be described as unthinking.”). 
102 797 N.Y.S.2d 1, 17 A.D.3d 209 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2005). 
103 Id. at 211. 
104 Id. at 210 (emphasis added). 
105 757 N.Y.S.2d 341, 302 A.D.2d 736 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2003). 
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since the Williams court, when considering whether to pierce an LLC, 
simply said: 
While we acknowledge that upon a finding to pierce 
the corporate veil, personal liability may be imposed if 
plaintiff can show (1) [Luce] exercised complete dom-
ination of the corporation in respect to the transaction 
attacked; and (2) that such domination was used to 
commit afraud or wrong against the plaintiff which re-
sulted in plaintiff’s injury, as a factual question, the 
result must await a trial.106 
The Williams court, at most, implicitly sanctions piercing in the con-
text of LLCs, but does not adjudicate whether to pierce the LLC at 
issue, finding that to be a factual matter that must wait for trial.107  
Yet, the Retropolis court uses it as its sole basis for its statement that 
piercing somehow applies to LLCs.  The Retropolis court then offers 
language from Morris, that “[i]n so doing, plaintiff bears ‘a heavy 
burden of showing that the corporation was dominated as to the 
transaction attacked and that such domination was the instrument of 
fraud or otherwise resulted in wrongful or inequitable consequences.’ 
”108  Thus, while Retropolis makes it clear that New York LLCs are 
subject to piercing, the case offers no support for that conclusion, and 
more saliently, no clarity on specific factors that should be used when 
considering piercing an LLC. 
Despite these admitted deficiencies, after Retropolis, through 
the magic of stare decisis, LLCs were now clearly open to piercing 
claims.  Retropolis has been cited forty-nine times in the past nine 
years.
 109  The language that piercing the corporate veil “applies” to 
LLCs has been picked up in nine cases.110  The Eastern District has 
 
106 Id. at 739. 
107 Id. 
108 Retropolis, 17 A.D.3d at 210 (citing TNS Holdings v. MKI Sec. Corp. 703 N.E.2d 749, 
751 (N.Y. 1998)). 
109 See, e.g., Sensitive Touch, 2009 WL 4756393, at *1; Bd. of Managers of Arches at 
Cobble Hill Condo. v. Hicks & Warren, LLC, 856 N.Y.S.2d 22, 18 Misc. 3d 1103(A) (Sup. 
Ct. Kings County 2007); Quebecor World (USA), Inc., v. Harsha Assocs., L.L.C., 445 F. 
Supp. 2d 236, 243 (W.D.N.Y. 2006); Matias ex rel. Palma, 841 N.Y.S.2d 279; Colonial Sur. 
Co. v. Lakeview Advisors, LLC, 941 N.Y.S.2d 371, 373 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2012). 
110 Colonial Sur. Co., 941 N.Y.S.2d 371; Sensitive Touch, 2009 WL 4756393; Bd. of 
Managers of Arches at Cobble Hill Condo., 856 N.Y.S.2d 22; Hearst Mags. v. McCaffery, 
No. 101303/2011, 2012 WL 7658628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug. 31, 2012); Quebecor 
World (USA), Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 236; 2626 BWAY LLC v. Broadway Metro Assocs., LP, 
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twice gone beyond both the letter and arguably the spirit of the 
Retropolis court’s language.  First, in In re Shore to Shore Realty, 
Inc.,111 the district court noted that: “[w]here appropriate, a plaintiff 
may seek to pierce the corporate veil of a corporation or an LLC to 
hold its owners liable for the debts of the corporation or LLC.”112  
The court cited Jackson v. Corporategear, LLC,113 for this proposi-
tion, but the Jackson court simply mentioned in a footnote that the 
defendant was an LLC and offered no support for the proposition that 
LLCs can be pierced.114 
Second, the Eastern District further broadened its interpreta-
tion of Retropolis, in In Re Stamou;115 the court cited Retropolis to 
support its conclusion that “[t]he doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil applies to limited liability companies just as it does to corpora-
tions.”116
 
 There is a substantive difference between the Retropolis 
court finding that the doctrine is “applicable” to LLCs in general, and 
the Stamou court finding the doctrine applies “just as it does” to cor-
porations.  Oddly, the Stamou court offers only § 609 to support its 
broadening of Retropolis, when clearly § 609 stands for nothing of 
the sort.117 
Another federal court misstatement of precedent appears in 
Monteleone v. The Leverage Group.118  The district court somehow 
concludes that “[c]ourts apply the same veil-piercing analysis to LLC 
defendants as to corporations,”119 by relying on MAG Portfolio Con-
sultant, GMBH v. Merlin Biomed Group LLC,120 which says no such 
thing.
 121  The court in MAG Portfolio evaluated the unity of interest 
 
No. 10586/2010, 2011 WL 3631959 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug. 11, 2011); In re 
Stamou, No. 8-09-2013-78895 (REG), 2013 WL 209473 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2013); 
Kleinman, 32 Misc.3d 1219(A). 
111 No. 8-08-72767-reg., 2011 WL 350526 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2011). 
112 Id. at *5. 
113 No. 04 Civ. 10132(DC), 2005 WL 3527148, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2005). 
114 The court looks at piercing in the context of whether a bankruptcy trustee has standing 
to assert claims based upon piercing the corporate veil or alter ego theories.  The court’s only 
oblique reference to piercing an LLC is from its comment in a footnote that Corporategear is, 
in fact, an LLC.  Id. at *4 n.1. 
115 No. 8-09-78895 (REG), 2013 WL 209473 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2013). 
116 Id. at *7 (finding the Morris test met and piercing the LLC veil) (emphasis added). 
117 Id. 
118 No. CV 08-1986 (CPS) (SMG), 2009 WL 249801 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2009). 
119 Id. at *3. 
120 268 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2001). 
121 Id. 
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and injury prongs with appropriate precedent support.122  With re-
spect to the factors necessary to determine whether to pierce the LLC, 
the court remanded, and noted that “the hearing was very brief and 
involved precious little fact finding, while our case law teaches de-
termining whether to pierce the corporate veil is a very fact specific 
inquiry involving a multitude of factors.”123  The court never held that 
the corporate piercing analysis applies to LLCs.  Yet after Monteleo-
ne, other federal courts continue to use corporate law piercing con-
cepts when evaluating claims to pierce LLCs.124 
The application of piercing to LLCs in state courts has also 
developed by courts simply adding parenthetical references to LLCs 
into existing precedents dealing with corporate veil piercing.  These 
courts are choosing their words carefully, unlike some of their judi-
cial colleagues.125  But query whether simply adding a parenthetical 
reference to LLCs into a reiteration of existing corporate law piercing 
precedent is viable without any other support or precedent.  In 
Grammas v. Lockwood Associates,126 an often-cited piercing case, 
plaintiff buyers sought to hold the defendant sellers liable for fraud 
and breach of warranty.127  The Supreme Court, Appellate Division 
specifically and expressly noted that “a party may seek to hold a 
member of an LLC individually liable despite this statutory proscrip-
tion [§ 609] by application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil.”128  The Grammas court went on to essentially create new law 
by reframing existing corporate piercing doctrine as applying to 
piercing LLCs with just its addition of the words “[or LLC]” to lan-
 
122 Id. at 63.  For the unity of interest and injury prongs from Morris, the court cites Am. 
Fuel Corp. v. Utah Energy Dev. Co., 122 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 1997), rather than Morris; 
for the Passalacqua factors, the court cited Freeman, 119 F.3d at 1053, which restates Pas-
salacqua. 
123 MAG Portfolio, 268 F.3d at 64. 
124 The Southern District pierced the LLC veil in Push, Inc. v. Production Advisors, Inc., 
as if both defendants were corporations, although one was an LLC.  No. 09 Civ. 4722(NRB), 
2010 WL 1837776 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 15, 2010).  In Sykes v. Mel Harris & Assocs., LLC, 757 F. 
Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), the court applied Morris and found no grounds to dismiss the 
complaint alleging PLLCV against the defendant LLC.  See also Atateks Foreign Trade, Ltd. 
v. Private Label Sourcing, LLC, 402 F. App’x 623 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming the district 
court’s decision to pierce the “corporate” veil of an LLC); Xiotech Corp. v. Express Data 
Prods. Corp., 11 F. Supp. 3d 225 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding no grounds to pierce the LLC 
veil, based solely on corporate law principles). 
125 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
126 944 N.Y.S.2d 623 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2012). 
127 Id. at 624. 
128 Id. at 625. 
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guage authorizing piercing the corporate veil from East Hampton Un-
ion Free School District v. Sandpebble Builders.129  However, the 
Grammas court’s apparent efforts to adapt the corporate law doctrine 
to LLCs by conforming the language to include LLCs were not en-
tirely successful or consistent, since it failed to change the term 
“shareholder” to owner, as shown by the court: 
In order to state a viable cause of action under the doc-
trine of piercing the corporate veil, the “plaintiff must 
allege facts that, if proved, indicate that the sharehold-
er exercised complete domination and control over the 
corporation [or LLC] and ‘abused the privilege of do-
ing business in the corporate [or LLC] form to perpe-
trate a wrong or injustice.’ ”130 
Grammas has been relied on extensively.131  And the Grammas 
court’s approach of simply adding “[or LLC]” to create piercing law 
for LLCs has been adopted in four other cases.132  Like Grammas, 
none of the subsequent cases offer any legal support or justification 




129 Id. (modifying East Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 944 N.E.2d 1135, 1136 (N.Y. 
2011)). 
130 Id.  The court purports to quote from East Hampton Union Free School District, but 
East Hampton does not have the “[or LLC]” addition. 
131 See, e.g., Baker, Sanders, Barshay, Grossman, Fass, Muhlstock & Neuworth, LLC v. 
Comprehensive Mental Assessment & Med. Care, P.C., 974 N.Y.S.2d 93 (App. Div. 2d 
Dep’t 2013) (citing Grammas and finding that the defendant “dominated the plaintiff limited 
liability company, and engaged in acts amounting to an abuse of the privilege of doing busi-
ness in that form so as to perpetrate a wrong or injustice on them,” relying on Grammas to 
support piercing the veil). 
132 The courts in Blum v. Spaha Capital Management, LLC, No. 13 Civ. 3795 (GWG), 
2014 WL 4545925 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2014), De Sole v. Knoedler Gallery, LLC, No. 12 
Civ. 2313 (PGG)(HBP), 2013 WL 592666 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2013); and Sutton Apts. Corp. 
v. Bradhurst 100 Dev. LLC, No. 104289/10, 2012 WL 2534881 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 
June 18, 2012), all relied on the Grammas adjustment to East Hampton, attributing the quote 
to Grammas. 
133 The Blum court offered a parenthetical “alteration in original” after the quote from 
Grammas as its only justification for extending the principle of piercing from corporations to 
LLCs.  Blum, 2014 WL 4545925.  In Board of Managers of Caton, the court adopted the 
Grammas court’s approach, yet attributed the quote with the addition of the “[or LLC]” lan-
guage to the East Hampton Union Free court.  41 Misc. 3d 1231(A), at *8.  The court did 
not include the parenthetical “alteration in original.” 
 Another court also used a parenthetical addition to implicitly support its application of 
piercing the corporate veil to LLCs; the Supreme Court, Appellate Division noted that “[i]n 
order to state a claim for alter-ego liability plaintiff is generally required to allege: ‘complete 
domination of the corporation [here PFLLC] in respect to the transaction attacked.’ ”  Baby 
Phat Holding Co., LLC v. Kellwood Co., 997 N.Y.S.2d 67, 70 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2014).  
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Other New York state courts have embraced the power of the 
parenthetical as a way to bring LLCs into otherwise purely corporate 
doctrine.  The court in Kleinman v. Blue Ridge Foods, LLC134 found 
that the LLC’s obligations under an employment contract with plain-
tiff should not be imputed to the sole owner of the LLC, based on 
corporate piercing but adds in: “[g]enerally, a corporation (or in this 
case, a limited liability company) exists independently of its owners 
(members), who are not personally liable for the corporate obliga-
tions.”135 
The court in Last Time Beverages Corp. v. F&V Distribution 
Co., LLC136 took the same tactic and added in “[or limited liability 
company]” into the corporate law piercing precedent it relied on.137  
But the Last Time Beverage court offered some additional context, 
applying some of the Passalacqua factors, noting that: 
In piercing F & V’s limited liability company veil and 
imposing liability on Hornell, the referee and the Su-
preme Court properly considered several factors, in-
cluding that: (1) Hornell and F & V had overlapping 
ownership, officers, and personnel; (2) both compa-
nies shared the same office space with other common-
ly-owned business entities; (3) both companies failed 
to observe certain formalities such as keeping certain 
records; and (4) F & V was not adequately capitalized, 
without a substantial loan from Hornell, to undertake 
this business venture.138 
 
The court makes absolutely no distinction between PFLLC (the defendant LLC) and a corpo-
ration. 
134 Kleinman v. Blue Ridge Foods, LLC, No. 9603/2011, 2011 WL 2899428 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Kings County July 7, 2011). 
135 Id. at *13. 
136 Last Time Beverage Corp. v. F & V Distrib. Co., 951 N.Y.S.2d 77, 98 A.D.3d 947 
(App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2012). 
137 Id. at 950. 
The corporate or limited liability company veil will be pierced “to 
achieve an equitable result,” among other instances, “[w]hen a corpora-
tion [or limited liability company] has been so dominated by . . . another 
corporation and its separate entity so ignored that it primarily transacts 
the dominator's business instead of its own and can be called the other’s 
alter ego.” 
Id. (quoting Austin Powder Co. v. McCullough, 628 N.Y.S.2d 855, 216 A.D.2d 825, 827 
(App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1995)). 
138 Id. at 951 (citing Wm. Passalacqua Builders, 933 F.2d at 139). 
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So the Last Time Beverage court engaged in legal analysis and found 
a substantive basis for concluding that the LLC veil should be 
pierced, and did not simply add in parentheticals to corporate law 
principles to support its holding.139 
Even before Retropolis, New York courts did not decline to 
pierce an LLC simply because of its LLC status.  Rather, the courts 
that decline to pierce do so because they find that the corporate law 
requirements for piercing have not been met.140  Inexplicably, how-
ever, after Retropolis, some New York state courts continue to apply 
the corporate piercing doctrine to evaluate LLC piercing claims, ra-
ther than choosing to explore, expand and develop a doctrine specifi-
cally for the hybrid LLC. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel posit that corporate veil 
piercing “seems to happen freakishly.  Like lightning, it is rare, se-
vere and unprincipled.”141  The same can arguably be said about LLC 
veil piercing.  The hybrid LLC has the benefit of corporate law and 
partnership law underpinnings, and the extensive bodies of statutory 
and case law associated with these two well-established forms of 
business.  But with no statutory guidance on when and how to pierce 
 
139 Id. at 950. 
140 See, e.g., Avila v. Distinctive Dev. Co, 991 N.Y.S.2d 89, 91 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2014) 
(finding that the complaint did not allege that the individual defendant “abused the privilege 
of doing business in the corporate form”) (emphasis added); Bd. of Managers of Arches, 18 
Misc. 3d 1103(A), at *5 (finding plaintiff’s piecing theory predicated on nothing more than 
“speculation, innuendo, and conjecture”); Bd. of Managers of Park Slope Views Condo. v. 
Park Slope View, LLC, 972 N.Y.S.2d 142, 39 Misc. 3d 1221(A), at *9 (Sup. Ct. Kings 
County 2013) (finding “the complaint fails to include any allegation of fact which would al-
low a piercing of the corporate veil”) (emphasis added); F&M Precise Metals, Inc. v. 
Goodman, 798 N.Y.S.2d 344, 4 Misc. 3d 1023(A), at *2-3 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 2004) 
(evaluating whether “a cause of action to pierce the corporate veil can be made out from 
within the four corners of the pleading, together with Plaintiff’s evidence in opposition to the 
motion” and concluding that the piercing claim should be dismissed) (emphasis added); Mil-
lennium Constr., 44 A.D.3d at 1016 (finding no basis to pierce the LLC and hold the “sole 
shareholder” liable); Sudano v. Nayci Contracting Assocs., LLC, 867 N.Y.S.2d 20, 20 Misc. 
3d 1118(A) (Sup. Ct. Kings County 2008); Country Pointe at Dix Hills Home Owners Ass’n 
v. Beechwood Org., 873 N.Y.S.2d 510, 21 Misc. 3d 1110(A), at *6 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 
2008) (declining to pierce the LLC veil since the plaintiff has failed to meet the “heavy bur-
den” of showing domination leading to inequitable consequences); Rakus, Inc. v. 3 Red G, 
LLC, 906 N.Y.S.2d 783, 26 Misc. 3d 1206(A) (Sup. Ct. Kings County 2010); Doubet, LLC 
v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 934 N.Y.S.2d 33, 32 Misc. 3d 1209(A), at * 17 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
County 2011) (declining to pierce the LLC veil after applying corporate doctrine only). 
141 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 25, at 89. 
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LLCs, the courts take the arguably logical step of applying corporate 
piercing law to these hybrid forms of business, that are, after all, a 
blend of corporate law and partnership law.  But does the corporate 
law doctrine fit?  Is the only relevant difference between a corpora-
tion and an LLC the decreased need to rigidly adhere to corporate 
formalities? 
Twenty years after the enactment of the NYLLCL, the doc-
trine of LLC piercing is cobbled together based on corporate law 
principles resulting in the Retropolis decision.  The doctrine advances 
through a judicial affinity for parentheticals and misapplications of 
precedent.  At both the state and federal level, courts have not been 
careful with their language, showing that they either do not under-
stand that LLCs are not corporations, do not believe the two forms of 
business are truly different from one another, or, with respect to 
piercing, just do not care.  But LLCs are not corporations and LLC 
piercing requires a clear, thoughtful, and predictable standard that 
recognizes the differences.142 
When we as lawyers, judges, and students of the law engage 
in statutory construction, there are certain things that are sacrosanct.  
The meaning of words is one.  Our system of precedents requires that 
we thoughtfully build our doctrine, with careful and appropriate lay-
ering of case law to anchor the doctrine.  Our courts should be 
thoughtful and deliberate in the further development of this doctrine, 
in a way that promotes fairness while honoring the legislative intent 
of the NYLLCL.  New York LLC piercing decisions will thus be 




142 See Gregory Bell, Veil Piercing and LLCs: Supporting the Case for a Meaningful, Leg-
islated Standard, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 615, 632-36 (2011). 
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